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Abstract:  Some believe that the mere beneficiaries of wrongdoing of 
others ought to disgorge their tainted benefits. Others deny that claim. 
Both sides of this debate concentrate on unavoidable beneficiaries of the 
wrongdoing of others, who are presumed themselves to be innocent by 
virtue of the fact they have neither contributed to the wrong nor could 
they have avoided receiving the benefit. But as we show, this 
presumption is mistaken for unavoidable beneficiaries who intend in 
certain ways to benefit from wrongdoing, and who have therefore done 
something wrong in forming and acting on such an intention  
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This article is concerned with the moral assessment of agents who benefit 
from the wrongdoing of others. Our running example involves the 
assassination of the President. In the aftermath of the assassination, the Vice 
President automatically becomes President, and that promotion is of benefit to 
her.  Of course assassinating the President is wrong. But suppose the Vice 
President was not in cahoots with the assassin, nor was there anything she 
could have done to prevent his dastardly deed. She simply benefits from his 
wrongdoing by gaining higher office, and there was nothing that she could do 
to avoid doing so.  
Is there is anything wrong with her benefiting in that way? Many would 
answer in the negative. If the Vice President is merely the innocent 
beneficiary of the wrongdoing, and she could not have avoided benefitting 
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from it, then the fact that her benefit derives from someone else's wrongdoing 
is (they would say) no cause for moral concern.  Recently, however, a 
different approach to such cases has been emerging. Advocates of what we 
will call the "wrongful benefits" principle argue that there is something wrong 
in enjoying the fruits of wrongdoing, and that moral duties fall upon even 
innocent and unavoidable beneficiaries of wrongdoing in consequence.  They 
are under a duty to give back or to give up benefits that they hold as a result 
of wrongs – even if those wrongs are not their own, and even if they could not 
have avoided receiving the benefit.  In the case of the Vice President 
(particularly one whose own political agenda is very different from the dead 
President's) that might mean that she should resign or to call early elections 
after an assassination, in a way she would have no reason to do had 
President died of natural causes.1   
The wrongful benefits principle has been defended on various competing 
grounds (see e.g. Butt 2007; Goodin 2013).2 Various objections have also 
been raised against it (e.g. Fullinwader 1975; Husbey 2015; Knight 2013). For 
the purposes of this article, we remain agnostic as to which view is correct.  
Instead, our goal is to draw attention to an oversight on the part of all parties 
to that debate. Both defenders and deniers of the principle of wrongful 
benefits focus on people who are unavoidable beneficiaries of the wrongdoing 
of others, agents who have not contributed to the wrong themselves and who 
cannot avoid receiving the benefit (e.g. Anwander 2005; Butt 2007; Goodin 
2013; Gosseries 2004; Huseby 2015). The Vice President is typical in that 
regard. Supporters of the principle of wrongful benefits argue that, although 
such unavoidable beneficiaries are not to blame for their being in their 
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situation, there is nonetheless something wrong about the fact of being in their 
situation, and the wrongness of that generates duties of disgorgement. 
Deniers of the principle argue that there is nothing morally wrong about 
beneficiaries being in that situation, and that therefore no special duties of 
disgorgement arise.  
What both sides of the debate ignore, however, are the intentions of 
beneficiaries with regard to their benefit and to the wrongdoing from which the 
benefit (unavoidably) arose. Consider again the Vice President. Suppose that 
she intended both the benefit (her acquiring higher office) and the President’s 
assassination as a means to that. Indeed, suppose that she intended to hire 
someone to assassinate the President so she could secure his office, if 
necessary.  It just so happened that she did not need to act on those 
intentions, because the benefits were anyway bestowed on her when 
someone else assassinated him first. Be that as it may, the fact that she 
harboured such intentions should, we will argue, alter our moral assessment 
of her. Intending that a wrongdoing occur, so that you can benefit from it (or 
for virtually any other reason, come to that), can be wrong in itself, in ways we 
shall show.   
This proposition has implications for both supporters and deniers of the 
wrongful benefits principle.  Those who oppose the principle must 
acknowledge there is at least one type of unavoidable beneficiary from 
wrongdoing whom they too should agree has done wrong – viz., unavoidable 
beneficiaries who had been intending the wrongdoing from which they benefit. 
Those who support the principle of wrongful benefits should similarly 
recognize that people who intended to benefit from the wrongdoing of others 
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are worse than people who merely find themselves in that position, and 
people who intended the wrong from which they benefit are worse yet again.  
In short, the fact that agents are unavoidable beneficiaries of 
wrongdoing cannot in itself fully settle the moral assessment of those agents, 
as has hitherto been assumed in the literature. Rather, a full moral 
assessment of such agents also requires us to assess their intentions 
concerning the benefit and the wrongdoing from which it arises.  
The article unfolds as follows. Section I explores in greater detail the 
problem of assigning moral responsibility to agents like the Vice President. A 
common objection to attributions of moral responsibility in such cases is that, 
since the Vice President has not done anything to contribute to the actual 
assassination as it actually transpired, she is not morally blameworthy. Our 
response is that, by intending that the President be assassinated, the Vice 
President has in fact engaged in some blameworthy "doing." Section II 
explains how intentions involve "doings" for which moral responsibility – and 
following from that, a duty to relinquish benefits – can be assigned. Section III 
returns to the question of benefiting from wrongdoing. We identify two types of 
"intending to benefit," distinguishing between those who "intend to benefit 
conditionally" and those who "intend to benefit simpliciter" (and hence who 
must intend the wrongdoing from which they benefit). We then examine how 
both defenders and deniers of the wrongful benefits principle should view 
people in each position. Section IV examines the problem of how to tell 
intentional beneficiaries apart from unintentional ones, and points to the 
overall implications of our account.  
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I.  Would Have Done 
 
Return to our running example.  Suppose that, while the Vice President was in 
no way involved in the assassination that actually occurred, she had decided 
to gain higher office by arranging the President's assassination herself if 
necessary.  She would have facilitated the wrongdoing, had that been 
necessary in order for her to obtain that benefit. She would not have 
intervened to prevent the assassination, even had she been able to do so.  
As it turned out, however, someone else assassinated the President 
first.  There was nothing the Vice President needed to do to ensure his death 
or her elevation as a result of it, nor was there (as it turned out) anything she 
could have done to avoid either his assassination or her elevation.  But of 
course (or so let us suppose) she couldn't have known that someone else 
would assassinate the President (with any certainty, anyway) at the time she 
was deciding what she would and wouldn't do to secure the presidency for 
herself.  
In describing the Vice President's intentions, we spoke of things she 
"would have done, if necessary."  She would have, if necessary – but the 
blunt fact of the matter is that it wasn't, and she didn't. Can you ever be 
implicated in wrongdoing purely by virtue of facts about what you 
counterfactually would (or would not) have done? Does what people "would 
have done" morally matter, in ways that can implicate them in a wrongdoing?3   
Maybe not.  Recall Ronald Dworkin's story of the poker game (Dworkin 
1975, 18): 
Suppose you and I are playing poker and we find, in the middle of a 
hand, that the deck is one card short.  You suggest that we throw that 
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hand in, but I refuse because I know I am going to win and I want the 
money in the pot.  You ... say that I would certainly have agreed to that 
procedure had the possibility of the deck being short been raised in 
advance.  [I reply:]  I am lucky that you did not raise the point.... 
 
Dworkin says that, from the fact "that I would have agreed if I had been asked 
in advance of play[, i]t does not follow that those rules may be enforced 
against me if I have not, in fact, agreed to them." (Ibid.) And that is surely the 
correct conclusion in that case – or anyway it is in a raft of cases closely 
related to that one.4  
There are other cases, however, in which what you "would have done 
(but didn't)" does seem – at least at first blush – to matter in ways that 
implicate you as a joint wrongdoer together with those who have themselves 
performed the wrongful action.  Consider the case of the backup assassin: 
Jack and Jill are partners in a conspiracy to assassinate the president.  
Each came to today's rally with a loaded gun.  Jack will be in a good 
position to take the first shot (he will be in the receiving line to greet the 
president upon arrival).  Jill serves as the backup assassin, who is firmly 
resolved to kill the president if for any reason Jack fails to.  In the event, 
Jack is successful and Jill never needs to fire her weapon.5 
 
Backup assassin Jill is clearly an accomplice in the assassination.  She did 
not merely commit some other wrong related to but different than 
"assassination" (in the same way that "attempted murder" is a separate 
offence in the vicinity of "murder").  She literally took part in the assassination. 
In the case of the backup assassin, however, what makes her part of the 
assassination is not what Jill "would have done," had Jack's pistol jammed.  It 
is not that counterfactual that implicates her in the assassination. Instead, it is 
a fact about things that she actually did do.  She participated in the 
conspiracy.  She accepted the backup assassin role.  She came on the 
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appointed day, pistol loaded and ready to shoot.  Ex hypothesi, in our running 
example, the Vice President didn't do any of those things.  
Let us take the backup assassin as our template, however.  The lesson 
to be drawn from that case for the analysis of a would-be assassin – like the 
Vice President – is that we need to be looking for some sort of a doing, not a 
"would have done," if we are to blame the Vice President in relation to the 
wrong of assassinating the President.   
Could a beneficiary such as the Vice President in our running example in 
any sense be doing something that implicates her in wrongdoing? She has 
not conspired or colluded in the wrongdoing or failed to prevent it; nor, as it 
turns out, could she avoid benefitting from it.  Still, we will argue that she has 
done something that amounts to wrongdoing – a doing connected with her 
coming to have the intention that a wrong be done, and further doings that 
follow from that. And, we shall argue, those doings implicate her in the wrong 
of assassinating the President – in that type of wrong, even if ex hypothesi not 
in the token wrong of the President being assassinated at the particular 
moment by the particular gunman who actually assassinated him. She has 
done things to see to it that the President is assassinated, and those doings 
are wrong, even if her own doings are causally inert in the actual way in which 
the President ends up being assassinated. 
 
II.  Intentions and Doings 
 
Certainly at criminal law, and some would say in morality alike, ascriptions of 
blameworthiness for wrongdoing require the conjunction of mens rea and an 
actus reum. Wrongdoings represent the confluence of intentions and actions.  
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Just as there can be no wrongdoing without wrongful intentions, neither on 
this account can there be any wrongdoing without a wrongful doing.6   
That is contestable.  But those who think that bad attitudes are enough 
to condemn someone as a wrongdoer will need no further convincing that the 
Vice President is in the wrong.  So the focus of this article will be on someone 
who thinks that wrongful doings as well as wrongful intentions are indeed 
required for there to be a wrong.7  Our argument will be that that proposition 
should not lead us to absolve agents like the would-be-assassin who "merely 
intends to do wrong" of all moral responsibility for wrongdoing.  
The reason is precisely that there are certain types of doings that the 
would-be assassin is actually engaged in (one of which is familiar within the 
philosophy of action, the other less so). Furthermore, as we will show in the 
next section, these sorts of doings should at least sometimes be regarded as 
wrong, a connection that action theorists have not heretofore drawn (e.g. Mele 
2003). Identifying those wrongful doings that may be involved with intendings 
constitutes our answer to the challenge "where's the actus reum?" in 
intending to benefit from wrongdoing. 
 
 
A.  What We Do When We Intend 
 
Intentions, like beliefs, are states of mind.  As such, they do not in themselves 
constitute actions or hence "doings."  Yet even if "having an intention" is not 
an action in itself, "coming to have it" and the consequences of having it will 
almost (if not quite) invariably involve some genuine actions.  
Confronted with the question "where's the action in intending?" Donald 
Davidson (1980, 89) replies, "the action is forming an intention."8  True, 
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perhaps not all intentions are self-consciously formed own (Mele 2003, 
chapter 9). But even where we come by intentions in ways other than by a 
deliberate act of will in forming them, a related mental action would be 
involved in "reflectively endorsing" those intentions as our own.9  For 
simplicity, we shall henceforth use the term "forming" to cover both cases.  
The crucial thing to note for present purposes is just this.  Both forming and 
reflectively endorsing an intention constitute an exercise of the will. "Forming," 
"endorsing" and "exercising" are all active voice terms that seem perfectly apt 
in this context, even though no physical action has taken place.10  
Intending of this sort is "practical intending" directed at an exercise of 
agency (Bratman 1987). Practical intending is not just "fantasizing" or 
"envisioning." Practical intending concerns a plan to do something, something 
that is intended to (and might realistically, with some non-negligible 
probability) happen through the agency of that agent.11 Admittedly, the actions 
that practical intending involves (forming the intention, or reflectively 
endorsing it) are mental actions.  Furthermore, they may be quite brief, over in 
an instant. But they are no less actions for either of those facts. They are the 
very first steps in the exercise of one’s temporally extended agency (Bratman 
2007, chapter 2). They are not merely a precursor toward some subsequent 
"genuine" doing, but rather already part of that doing.   
A second set of actions consequent upon practical intendings involve 
what we call "exercises of supervisory agency." When you form or reflectively 
endorse an intention that something becomes the case, you commit yourself 
(among other things) to "seeing to it" that that happens. That "seeing to it" is 
what we refer to as the "exercise of supervisory agency." 
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In some cases, that might entail taking some overt actions of a physical 
sort. For example, an agent who forms the intention to assassinate the 
President might "see to it" that the assassination happens by purchasing a 
gun herself, attending the election rally pistol at the ready, and so on. In other 
cases it might involve encouraging or facilitating others in doing it, or simply 
getting out of their way.  But in some cases, "seeing to it" might involve no 
more than checking that someone else is doing the job. It is in the nature of 
supervisory agency that, if all is proceeding as they wish, supervisors need 
not intervene actively in the course of affairs.  
Suppose that the Vice President, immediately upon forming the intention 
that the President die, learns that unidentified others are planning to 
assassinate him.  She keeps an eye on the newspapers to make sure they 
have not been arrested yet; she bides her time, standing ready to kill they 
President if they do not; but the others soon succeed, rendering her 
redundant.  In one sense, the Vice President did not have to do anything.  But 
in another clear sense, she already has done something, in checking to make 
sure that the plans of the other assassins had not been thwarted before the 
assassination occurs. She has "turned her attention" to the matter, she has 
opened the newspaper, and so on. The actions, mental or otherwise, involved 
in such exercises of supervisory agency constitute a second actus grounding 
the agent’s moral blameworthiness for wrongdoing. 
Of course,  "just checking" is not necessarily wrong in itself.  It depends 
on the purpose.  Checking to see if wrongdoing of others is going to occur can 
be the right thing to do (as it is, when it is the precursor to taking steps to 
prevent such wrongdoing, for example). Whether the checking is right or 
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wrong depends on the future details of the larger plan – the larger exercise of 
temporally extended agency – within which the checking is embedded. That is 
the sense in which "checking to see if there's anything I can do to prevent it" 
is morally importantly different from "checking to make sure there's nothing 
else I need to do to make sure it will happen."  
Relate this, now, back to the Dworkin-inspired argument against basing 
moral culpability on counterfactuals. "What someone would have done," 
without any actual "doing," is indeed insufficient to ground moral culpability in 
that person (At least in the sense we are interested in here). That the Vice 
President would have arranged the President's assassination herself if 
someone else hadn't is not what gets her into moral trouble. Instead what gets 
her morally into trouble is what she has done, in forming the intention that the 
President be assassinated, and checking whether or not she needs to act 
further on those intentions.  
 
 
 B.  Moral Responsibility for Intending 
 
Where exactly is the wrong in that?  Clearly, in the case of the Vice President, 
it is not the wrong of actually herself assassinating the President. That came 
about, in the end, wholly through someone else's deeds. Nevertheless, we 
assign moral responsibility not only for doings that actually result in wrongs. 
We also assign moral responsibility for doings that run an unacceptable (i.e., 
morally unreasonable) risk of resulting in a wrong, even if in the end that does 
not eventuate in a wrong.12  
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Morality is not only supposed to provide us with post hoc assessments 
of fault and responsibility, credit and blame for what has already actually 
happened. Paradigmatically, morality is supposed also to be action-guiding. It 
is supposed to tell us how we should act at the time of acting, and in a world 
where we cannot know for certain what results our actions will yield. Rather 
than restricting our moral concern to retrospective reckoning of responsibility 
for the bad outcomes that an agent's actions have actually caused, we should 
extend it prospectively to all the outcomes that their actions could (with 
appreciable probability) have been expected to cause at the time those 
actions were undertaken.   
One way of thinking about that is to ask whether the agent's actions 
supplied a NESS condition for the occurrence of a bad outcome. 13  By 
definition,  is a NESS condition of wrongdoing φ if and only if  is a 
necessary element of a sufficient set of conditions for wrongdoing φ to occur. 
There may be other necessary elements of the set of conditions required for φ 
to occur in that particular way; and there may be other ways (other sufficient 
sets of conditions) for φ to occur.   
Still, supplying a NESS condition such as  makes a modal difference.  It 
makes it possible for wrongdoing φ to occur, which would be impossible 
(along that particular pathway anyway) in the absence of . That makes the 
agent supplying the NESS condition  potentially causally responsible for 
wrongdoing φ occurring, and morally responsible for that. 14  
We assume here, of course, that the agent in question is capable of 
knowing that what she is doing does indeed constitute a necessary condition 
for a bad outcome to occur, in one of the possible ways it might occur. If there 
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is no way she could or should have known that, then she is excused moral 
responsibility on grounds of "unavoidable ignorance."15  
Crucially, we take it as axiomatic that any real-world agent almost 
invariably acts in circumstances of uncertainty (not least because of 
uncertainty surrounding what other human agents will do).  An agent whose 
action supplies one of the necessary conditions for some bad outcome 
occurring typically does not know at the time of acting whether all the rest of 
the conditions that are required for that outcome to occur will also be present. 
Nor does she does not know at the time of acting whether some other 
sufficient set of conditions will causally pre-empt the one to which her action 
contributes a necessary element.  All she can do is assess a probability 
distribution over all those eventualities: how likely it is that the set of sufficient 
conditions to which she contributes one necessary element will actually end 
up producing the bad outcome in question.16   
Depending on the probability of that (and of course on how bad the 
outcome would be), we might judge her to have run an unacceptable risk of 
becoming causally, and hence morally, implicated in a bad outcome.17 
Forming an intention positively related to wrongdoing might, depending on 
that calculation, count as wrong in just that way.  
Return now to the case of the Vice President with which we began.  
There may be other ways (other sets of sufficient conditions) whereby the 
President's assassination might occur; and there may be other necessary 
elements missing that in the end preclude the assassination from occurring, 
even if the Vice President supplies that one necessary element for its 
occurring in some way involving her. Nonetheless, if by forming the intention 
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to assassinate the President, the Vice President provides one NESS condition 
for the assassination occurring in one way it might, she has done something 
that could well have made all the difference to the wrongdoing occurring. Of 
course, in the scenario that we are here envisioning, it turns out in the end 
that the assassination would have happened whatever the Vice President's 
intentions.  In retrospect, she can look back and say: "It was inevitable; there 
was nothing I needed to do to make it happen.”  But in prospect – at the time 
of acting – that is almost never something of which she could have been at all 
certain, and if there was a sufficient probability of her contribution being 
crucial then she is morally blameworthy. 
The same is true of exercises of supervisory agency. Pursuant to her 
intention that the President die, the Vice President checks.  Upon checking, 
she sees that she doesn’t presently need to do anything further to ensure the 
President’s death. But she checked, she had no way of knowing with 
confidence whether she needed to check – whether she is in a world in which 
she needs to do nothing further, or one in which she needs to make 
alternative arrangements or to take matters into her own hands.  In that latter 
case, which is not at all unlikely (Presidents are not assassinated every day, 
after all) her checking would have been a necessary element of a sufficient 
set of conditions for bringing about the assassination and she would have 
been taking a morally unacceptable risk of contributing to the President's 
being assassinated through her checking. 
Obviously, the moral assessment of an agent who is in the very early 
stages of wrongdoing – merely intending to do wrong – should be different 
from that of an agent who has already gone much further towards executing 
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that wrongdoing (e.g. buying a gun).  Both should be different, again, from the 
assessment of the agent who has actually executed the wrongdoing in full. 
Yet even early-stage contributions to wrongdoing can clearly be wrong, when 
there is unacceptable risk the wrongdoing will ensue as a result.18  
We freely admit that there are evidentiary problems in getting reliable 
access to what happens almost wholly inside someone else’s head. For that 
reason, the law probably ought not take cognizance of all of early-stage 
wrongdoings of the sort we have here associated with "merely intending."19  
But they certainly are matters of moral concern, even if they are not legally 
actionable. And they remain of moral concern, even if something later averts 
the wrongdoing (be it some other agent's action or inaction, or the agent's 
own change of mind). Creating an unreasonable risk of a wrongdoing's 
occurring is wrong, even if in the end that risk is averted.20 
 
 
III.  The Wrongness of Intending to Benefit 
 
So far we have shown that intendings almost invariably involve doings in at 
least two ways.  First is in forming the intention. Second is in exercising 
supervisory agency pursuant to that intention.  In both cases, you have done 
something.  In both cases you have exercised your will, even if you have not 
yet lifted a finger (although in "seeing to it," you typically will have done so).  
Such doings enable wrongdoing to occur, or at least provide one necessary 
condition of it occurring along one possible path by which it might occur.  
Given that wrongdoing is wrong, risking contributing causally to it can be 
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wrong, depending on the heinousness of the wrong and the probability of its 
occurring along the path your contribution enables.     
Let us now turn to apply those general propositions to the particular case 
of principal concern in this article:  benefiting from the wrongdoing of others.  
As we said in the outset, supporters of the wrongful benefits principle think 
that it is wrong to benefit from the wrongdoing of others. Importantly, they do 
not suppose that the recipient of those benefits has herself done something 
wrong. But they think that being in that position is wrong, and she ought to do 
what she can to avoid it (e.g. by giving up the benefits) (e.g. Butt 2007; 
Goodin 2013).  Deniers of the principle argue that there is nothing wrong in 
that position (e.g. Fullinwader 1975).  
Both sides focus on "unavoidable beneficiaries" – agents who did not 
play any role in the wrongdoing themselves, and who could not have avoided 
receiving the benefits. But they neglect the intentions of those agents, and the 
wrongful doings associated with forming and exercising supervisory agent in 
relation to those intentions. As we now show, the fact that you are an 
intentional beneficiary of wrongdoing can be an important moral fact for both 
supporters and deniers of the wrongful benefits principle.  
 
 
 A.  Two Kinds of Intending to Benefit from Wrongdoing of Others 
 
 We now turn to distinguish between two ways of intending to benefit from 
wrongdoing: "intending to benefit conditionally" and "intending to benefit 
simpliciter."  In both cases, we suggest, the intending agent may be 
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implicated in a wrongdoing – but as we go on to show in the next section, she 
would be implicated in a different sort of wrongdoing in each of those two 
cases. 
Sometimes "X intends to benefit from φ" refers to a case where "X 
intends to benefit if φ."  X does not intend that wrongdoing φ occurs, 
necessarily.  Nor is X committed in any way to seeing to it that wrongdoing φ 
occurs.  Rather, X's intention is purely conditional: if φ, then X intends to 
benefit from φ.   
"If" is perhaps an unduly forward-looking way of putting the point, 
implying that φ has not yet come to pass.  A more general way of describing 
the case might be "X intends to benefit given φ," leaving open the question of 
whether φ is in the past or in prospect.    
In the case in which φ has yet to occur, to say "X intends to benefit given 
φ" suggests that X forms the intention or sees to it that X benefits from φ, 
should φ come to pass.  While X does not form the intention or plan to do 
anything to see to it that φ does come to pass, X nonetheless makes sure that 
she is in a position where she benefits from φ, if φ does indeed come to 
pass.21   
In the case in which φ has already occurred, to say "X intends to benefit 
given φ" is to say that X forms the intention and sees to it that X will benefit, 
given the fact that φ has come to pass. Here too, there is no implication that X 
had formed the intention or seen to it that φ came about. She merely forms 
the intention or sees to it that she is the position where she benefits from the 
existence of φ. 
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Sometimes however "X intends to benefit simpliciter." That is importantly 
different.  There, X's "intending to benefit from φ" includes, as a crucial 
component of that intention, X's "intending the existence of φ from which X will 
benefit."22 That latter intention is not just some abstract logical corollary or 
causal consequence that the agent may or may not notice and internalize.  
Rather, it is part and parcel of "intending to benefit from φ simpliciter" that, in 
intending that the benefit occurs, one intends for φ (the source of that benefit) 
to occur.    
Once again, that intending involves doings.  In the first instance, it 
involves forming the intention that φ and the resulting benefit occur.  In 
second instance, and pursuant to that, it involves taking up a supervisory role 
in the present to do something further (if necessary) to see to it that those 
things (φ and the resulting benefit) actually occur.  
The agent who is intending to benefit simpliciter is already involved in a 
doing that is aimed towards some further wrongdoing.  She is, for example, 
checking whether more needs to be done to ensure the occurrence of the 
wrongdoing from which she intends to benefit. Furthermore, those doings are 
oriented towards potentially involving her agency further in wrongdoing (doing 
something further, as necessary, to facilitate the wrong taking place so she 
will attain the benefit). By intending that the wrong take place, the agent who 
is intending to benefit simpliciter is thereby implicated in wrongdoing. 
To reiterate, both types of beneficiaries are, in the cases under 
discussion, unavoidable beneficiaries. That is to say, as it turns out in the end, 
there is nothing they needed to do to ensure that they benefited, and there 
was nothing they could have done to avoid benefiting. But crucially for our 
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purposes, they could not know that for sure at the time.  Ex hypothesi, they 
formed intentions and engaged in supervisory doings pursuant to them to 
benefit from wrongdoing, supposing that there is some real chance that what 
they were doing might make a difference. That is what grounds their moral 
responsibility, and hence moral liability to being required to relinquish the 
benefits they received as a result of the other's wrongdoing, in the ways we 
now turn to discuss.  
 
B. Two Kinds of Wrongdoing  
We have identified two types of unavoidable beneficiaries from wrongdoing. 
Let us now turn to assess how these beneficiaries should be regarded in the 
debate on the principle of wrongful benefits.  Let us call φ the "principal 
wrongdoing," and denote it as "Wrong(φ)."  In our running example, that would 
be the President's being assassinated.23 The separate wrong (if a wrong it be) 
of benefiting from Wrong(φ) we will call "Wrong()." 
Supporters of the wrongful benefits principle find something wrong with 
someone's benefiting from the wrongdoing of others, even if she cannot avoid 
so benefitting. So they definitely think that Wrong() is indeed wrong.  If as 
they suppose unavoidably finding oneself in that position is wrong, then 
intending (even just conditionally) to put oneself in that wrongful position is 
even worse. Even if in the end the agent receives benefit  in some way she 
could not avoid, her forming the conditional intention to receive the benefit if 
Wrong(φ) occurred and taking actions pursuant to that intention makes those 
actions Wrong() – as well as of course of being in receipt of the benefits of 
others wrongdoing a Wrong() situation.   
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The agent's conduct is worse, yet again, if she formed and perhaps 
exercised supervisory agency with respect to an intention to benefit simplicter 
from Wrong(φ).  In that case, she intends not only Wrong() but also 
Wrong(φ) from which  flows. Even if in the end her intentions prove to be 
causally inert – even if turns out in the end that the benefit flowed to her 
unavoidably and through some path wholly independent of her own intentions 
–  in forming and exercising supervisory agency with respect the intention to 
benefit simpliciter, the agent had done something in furtherance of both 
Wrong() and Wrong(φ). Advocates of the principle of wrongful benefits would 
regard both types of wrong as wrong. Hence someone who intends to benefit 
simpliciter is doubly in the wrong, from their point of view.  
Deniers of the wrongful benefits principle deny the existence of 
Wrong(), at least as regards unavoidable beneficiaries of  Wrong(φ). If you 
do not think that a person who benefits unavoidably from the wrongdoing of 
others is in any way in the wrong, then you do not think Wrong() exists, at 
least so far as unavoidable beneficiaries are concerned.   
Still, even deniers of the wrongful benefits principle regard Wrong(φ) as 
wrong.  So even they should acknowledge beneficiaries are implicated in that 
type of wrongdoing if they intend to benefit simpliciter from Wrong(φ).  The 
reason is, as we have said, that intending part and parcel of what is to intend 
to benefit simpliciter from Wrong(φ) is to intend the existence of that Wrong(φ) 
which is required to yield you that benefit.  
Forming or exercising supervisory agency pursuant to an intention to 
benefit simpliciter implicates the Vice President in a  wrong of type φ – there, 
a presidential assassination.  It does so even if, in the end, there was nothing 
 21 
further that the Vice President actually needed to do to ensure that the token 
Wrong(φ) occurred.  She has done something to ensure that a wrong of type 
φ occurs, something that (for all she knew at the time) might have been 
essential to that wrong's occurring.  That is sufficient to implicate her in a 
wrong of type φ. How much moral responsibility follows from being implicated 
in a type of wrongdoing should, we suggest, be based on the similarity of the 
wrong actually done to the wrong risked; and the quantum of benefit she 
should be required to relinquish should be based on the quantum of benefit 
that she could have expected objectively expected from the wrongdoing to 
which she risked contributing.24.  
Deniers of the wrongful benefits principle might also see something 
wrong with "intending to benefit conditionally if Wrong(φ)," even if they do not 
see anything Wrong() with benefiting from φ if it does occur. At least some 
deniers of the principle would agree that it is wrong to seek out benefits from 
the wrongdoing of others, even if there is nothing wrong with unavoidably 
coming into possession of them (Fullinwader 1975, 318). Ex hypothesi, the 
innocent beneficiary has not instigated Wrong(φ). Nevertheless, those whose 
denial of the wrongful benefits principle turns heavily on the stipulation that 
the benefits were unavoidable might still find something morally objectionable 
about the beneficiary maneuvring herself into a position to benefit, if that 
wrongdoing does occur (which is of course precisely what someone who is 
"intending to benefit conditionally" does).   
Of course, in the scenarios here in view, the benefit turns out in the end 
to come to her unavoidably, and her maneuvring was unnecessary. But as we 
have argued above, an agent's actions should be assessed from the 
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perspective of what she could and should have known at the time of action; 
and she could not be sure at the time of acting that her benefit would be 
unavoidable. So even those who deny there is anything wrong with 
unavoidably benefiting from the wrongdoing of others might find something 
wrong about taking steps to benefit from the wrongdoing of others when such 
benefits might well have been avoidable. 
 
 C.  Implications for Beneficiaries of Historical Wrongdoings 
 
Consider the implications of our argument for beneficiaries of historical 
wrongdoings. Much (although by no means all) of the debate about benefiting 
from wrongdoings concerns the duties of current generations who benefitted 
from wrongdoings committed in the distant past (e.g. colonialism, racial 
discrimination or greenhouse gas emissions). What does our analysis have to 
say about such cases?  
On the face of it, it may not seem to add much beyond what can be had 
from the "wrongful benefits" principle itself. The reason is this. Intendings are 
always forward looking. They are intentions to do, have or be something, 
sometime in the future. You cannot therefore be properly said to presently 
"intend" a wrongdoing that has already occurred – especially not, if it occurred 
before you were born. Hence all intendings to benefit from things that have 
already occurred are, from that time forward, necessarily "conditional 
intendings"  – intendings to benefit, given that φ has occurred.   
Defenders of the "wrongful benefits" principle would still be troubled by 
those, of course. But they would be in favor of rectification of historical 
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wrongdoings on the basis of the "wrongful benefits" principle, already. Those 
who deny the principle of "wrongful benefits" are the ones in need of further 
persuasion. We had hoped to provide it through our analysis of "intending to 
benefit simpliciter," and the "intending the wrong that is required to produce 
the benefit that they intend to receive" that is part and parcel of that. But since 
intending is forward-looking, and you cannot intend what already exists, that 
analysis would seem to be inapplicable to wrongdoings that occurred long 
before today's agents were born.  
There is, however, one important way in which our analysis of "intending 
to benefit simpliciter" can apply to cases involving historical wrongdoings. 
Suppose that the only way in which you can benefit in the present from some 
wrongdoing in the past is to commit a wrong in the present. Suppose, for 
example, that constant efforts are required to protect and sustain the wrongful 
patterns initially put in place by some wrongdoing long ago, and suppose that 
protecting and sustaining wrongful patterns is itself wrong (Barry and Wiens, 
2014). Then intending that wrongdoing in the present would be part and 
parcel of what it is to "intend to benefit simpliciter" from the past wrongdoing. 
And intending a wrongdoing in the present is something that you can indeed 
intend, in a suitably forward-looking way.  
In that way, our analysis can indeed give even deniers of the "wrongful 
benefits" principle reason to worry about people's intending to benefit from 
historical wrongs. If there is some wrong that needs to be committed in the 
present to ensure that the wrongful states of affairs are perpetuated in ways 
that benefit them, then in "intending to benefit simpliciter" from the historical 
wrong an agent intends for the present-day wrong to occur. And even those 
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who deny that there is anything wrong about merely being in receipt of 
wrongful benefits have to agree that intending a present wrongdoing is indeed 
both coherent and itself wrong.  
The wrongs of racial or colonial or indigenous oppression are arguably 
all like that. The "founding acts" of oppression are all long in the past. But 
much needs to be done in the present to protect and sustain the patterns to 
which they have given rise (Lu, 2011; Young 2004, 2011). Anyone who 
"intends to benefit simpliciter" from those past wrongs ipso facto intends the 
present wrongs regularly required to renew, protect and sustain the wrongful 
patterns to which they have given rise. Intending for those wrongdoings to 
occur should be troubling even for those who see nothing wrong in merely 
being in receipt of wrongful benefits. 
 
 
V. Disavowing Wrongful Benefits  
 
Those who intend to benefit, either conditionally or simpliciter, from someone 
else's wrongdoing should be differentiated from the Unintentional Beneficiary. 
Consider again our Vice President. This time, suppose she has no intention 
for the President to be assassinated, she is deeply abhorred and upset by the 
assassination, and yet she benefits from it. Such an Unintentional Beneficiary 
is the beneficiary who would not contribute to φ, even if φ would not happen 
unless she contributed; nor would she seek to enjoy the benefits of φ, even if 
she costlessly could. The Unintentional Beneficiary does not form the 
intention to benefit, nor does she see to it either that φ occurs or that she 
benefits from φ if it does occur.  Therefore, the Unintentional Beneficiary is not 
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implicated in either of the wrongs under discussion.  She is not implicated in a 
principal "Wrong(φ)," nor is she guilty of "Wrong()."  
The proper moral evaluation of beneficiaries of the wrongdoing of others 
thus depends upon which type of beneficiary they are:  Unintentional or 
Intentional, and if Intentional whether Conditional or Simpliciter.25 To assess 
the moral status of beneficiaries from wrongdoing it is not sufficient to know 
that they are unavoidable beneficiaries: we also need to know their intentions.  
But this conclusion opens up a further challenge. As we indicated earlier, 
telling the three types of beneficiaries apart may prove to be difficult, since the 
differences are not externally easily observable.  Not only may the forming of 
an intention be extremely hard for outsiders to detect. So too may be the 
exercise of supervisory agency.  Even when "checking" involves more 
physical doings like opening the newspaper, the purpose for which she is 
reading the paper will often be opaque. 
Despite these evidentiary problems, our conclusions can be useful in 
various ways. First and foremost, it is useful for purposes of moral self-
assessment.26 Agents can reflect upon their own intentions with regard to 
wrongdoings – ones that they might undertake, ones that they might 
supervise, and ones from which they benefit – in order to judge for 
themselves whether or not they were in the wrong.  Prospectively, by pointing 
out the wrongs involved in intending to do wrong, our framework can guide 
morally conscientious agents away from certain sorts of intendings – however 
hard it may be for other agents in the world to detect the moral wrongdoings in 
question.   
 26 
Finally, and practically perhaps most importantly, consider what would 
be the pragmatic effects of a social practice (were one to grow up) of blaming 
people who wrongly intend to benefit from wrongdoing.  Precisely because an 
unintentional beneficiary could easily be mistaken for morally blameworthy 
beneficiaries of other sorts, there would be a natural social expectation that 
such a person would go to some lengths to disassociate herself from these 
wrongdoings. The fact that de facto she enjoys a benefit – cheap petroleum 
that came from invading some other country without cause, for example – is 
likely to make people not unreasonably suspicious of her intentions with 
regard to that benefit and/or wrongdoing that generated it, and to hold that 
against her.  
To prevent such confusions, she should naturally be expected to 
remonstrate – with whatever evidence she can muster – that, even though 
she is benefitting from wrongdoing, she is doing so unintentionally and against 
her will. Of course, ex hypothesi in the sorts of cases under discussion, she 
cannot avoid benefiting. But she could at least express her dismay and 
abhorrence of the fact that she is being put in the position where she benefits 
from the fruits of wrongdoing, unavoidably and against her will.27 For that 
protest to be persuasive, it would ideally come at some cost to herself – 
otherwise it will just count as “cheap talk."28 The fact that she is prepared to 
bear a cost to protest the wrongdoing and/or her benefiting from it would 
count as evidence that she is an unintentional beneficiary, who should 
therefore not be deemed to be implicated in wrongdoing.29 
Suppose that protesting in that way does become the norm among 
Unintentional Beneficiaries.  Then failure to take even low-cost opportunities 
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to protest the wrongdoing would presumably mark someone as an intentional 
beneficiary from wrongdoing and render them liable to moral criticism. Given 
that fact, Intentional Beneficiaries would then have incentives to masquerade 
as Unintentional ones by bearing some (perhaps even substantial) costs in 
protesting against the wrongdoings from which they benefit. Notice, however, 
that even "false signals" of that sort serve a useful social function. 
The stronger the protest against wrongdoing is, the greater will be the 
disincentive for such wrongdoing. Providing incentives to make protests – 
even insincere protests – against wrongdoing is thus likely to have positive 
consequences.  Even if no single unavoidable beneficiary can prevent the 
wrongdoing from occurring or recurring, if enough people protest against it 
then that could eventually help curtail the wrongdoing or prevent its 
recurrence.  Highlighting the wrongness in merely intending to benefit from 
wrongdoing is therefore an important exercise. The more widely recognized 
the wrongness of intending to benefit from wrongdoing is, the more likely that 
that realization is to reduce wrongdoing in the world. 
 
 
                                            
1 The significance of the parenthetical, in terms of the wrongful benefits 
principle, is that she would in that case have benefited more from the 
assassination. Of course, there still could be other reasons that would tip the 
balance against resignation or new elections.   
2 The different accounts of the principle set different limits to its applicability 
and scope. For example, Butt (2007) argues that the principle is triggered only 
with regard to ‘automatic benefits’. Overland and Haydar (2014) suggest that 
the principle is triggered only if the wrongdoer intends to benefit the 
beneficiary. While we do not discuss such variations here, we think it is fairly 
easy to tailor the example to whichever version of the principle one favours.  
3 Maybe counterfactual propositions about what someone "would have done" 
sometimes provide information about the agent's state of mind. And maybe it 
is morally bad in some sense or another to take a pro-attitude of any sort 
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toward wrongdoing – welcoming it, being glad it happened, being glad that 
you benefited from it, or whatever.  (A virtue ethicist would take it as evidence 
of your bad character, for example.)  But however bad a sheer bad attitude is 
in itself, it is even worse to do something. 
4 Some may challenge Dworkin’s example, saying that by agreeing to play 
poker each player implicitly commits herself to the rules of that game, and the 
rules of poker specify a deck of 52 cards. While the specific example may be 
problematic in that way, the basic point remains.  For example while it is true 
that I would have paid much more for the painting that I bought from you 
yesterday had we both realized that it was a Cezanne at the time, the fact that 
that I "would have done" does not imply that I must now send you a cheque 
for the difference. 
5 This case is adapted from Lepora and Goodin 2013, 56-8.  
6 The legal maxim "no punishment for intentions alone" dates back at least to 
the sixteenth century, when the court held in Hales v. Pettit that "imagination 
of the mind to do wrong, without an act done, is not punishable"; quoted in 
Abbate 1974, 301. 
7 Our focus more specifically is on those who doubt that, in the cases in view, 
there are "doings" of the requisite sort. It is familiar from the law of negligence 
that there can sometimes be wrongs without "intentions." However, the cases 
in view, such as the back-up assassin, would not fall under that category.  
8 That, Davidson continues, "is an event, ... an action, or at least something 
the agent does".  
9 Mele (2003) refers to such endorsement as "deciding." Having an intention 
need not necessarily involve a mental action of forming or reflectively 
endorsing; but in much the most common cases, we think, some such mental 
action is present, and those are the cases with which our analysis is 
concerned. Perhaps agents also have the duty to reflect upon their intentions 
with regard to wrongful actions, and that failure to do so amounts to culpable 
ignorance; but we will not pursue that point in this article. 
10 Brink (2013) similarly treats "thinking" as a first step in "acting" (even if, for 
evidentiary reasons, we might not want to criminalize it).  
11 This, we take it, is what distinguishes "fantasizing" about killing the 
President from  "practically intending" it. Of course, she might have mistaken 
beliefs about that; we return to that in footnote 17.  
12 The standard legal gloss is "unreasonable risk."  We shall use 
"unacceptable risk" to mean the same thing – i.e., "unreasonable, from a 
moral (or societal) point of view."  We eschew the term "unreasonable" in this 
connection simply because, given an agent with morally perverse goals, a 
course of action that is morally perverse may nonetheless be seen as 
pragmatically "reasonable" from that agent's point of view. 
13 See further the discussion of "potentially essential contributions" in Lepora 
and Goodin 2013, 61-5.  
14 Perhaps if the probability of her being causally implicated is vanishingly 
small we might excuse her of moral responsibility altogether.  Alternatively, 
perhaps in that case we should say that she is morally implicated but only a 
tiny bit of blame attaches because it was so unlikely that any bad 
consequences would follow. 
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15 Thus, we are not concerned here with agents who unwittingly provide a 
NESS condition for the wrong; for example, someone who bends down to tie 
her shoe, which was unbeknownst to her is a NESS condition for the assassin 
to get a clear shot at the President, bears no responsibility for the murder. 
16 By which we mean in this context of course "epistemic probability". That 
relates to the evidence available at the time of action. 
17 A person might have mistaken beliefs, believing a wrongful outcome to be 
either more or less likely than the available evidence shows it to be. For 
example, she may over- or underestimate her capacities to carry out her 
intentions. Insofar as the person could and should have known about that 
evidence, we deem her ignorance culpable and blame her for taking risks of 
wrongdoing on the basis of it. We may also blame her for taking risks that she 
incorrectly believed to be larger than best available evidence shows them 
really to be. 
18 In criminal law, much is made of the fact that an agent might always change 
her mind before acting on her intention to contribute to a wrong. See e.g. 
Yaffe, 2010,chapter 2 and Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, 
Article 25, 3. We remain agnostic as to whether that is the right approach for 
criminal law. But morally speaking, there is inevitably a real risk that the agent 
will not change her mind  – and again, she might rightly be blamed for running 
that risk. And even if she did change her mind, that does not wipe out the fact 
that, at the time she took that early step toward producing the wrong, she 
could not count on the fact that she would subsequently change her mind and 
not go through with it. 
19 Notice, however, that early-stage wrongdoings sometimes are legally 
actionable.  In the law of criminal complicity, the contributions of accessories-
before-the-fact to the principal wrongdoing are called "inchoate offences." 
They are things like conspiring, instigating, facilitating.  They precede the 
principal wrongdoing.  They pave the way for the principal wrongdoing.  They 
are part of or a contribution to a "principal wrongdoing in the making."  Indeed, 
they are steps toward making that wrongdoing occur.  See American Law 
Institute 1960, Article 5, T.D. No. 10; Ashworth  1995 chapter 11. These are 
offences, even if the principal wrongdoing doesn’t take place: they are 
offences precisely because they could have caused a wrong (even if they 
didn’t); they provided a NESS condition of the wrong occurring.  
20 If it is averted through her own agency then perhaps she should get some 
moral credit for that – but that is (we would insist) at the same time as still 
being held to blame for creating the risk in the first place. 
21 Maybe there is a limited number of people who could benefit from φ should 
φ come to pass, for example, and X sees to it that she will be among them if φ 
does come to pass. 
22 Since the wrongfulness of this stance derives wholly from the wrongness of 
"X's intending the existence of wrong φ," everything we say here about the 
wrongfulness of "intending to benefit simpliciter" will also be true of someone 
who intends the wrongdoing φ, actually benefits from the wrongdoing φ, but 
did not intend to benefit from the wrongdoing φ. 
23 Understood as the type rather than the token (as "the President's being 
assassinated" rather than as "the president's being killed in this particular 
way, by this particular person, on this particular day"). 
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24 Among other things, that would suitably disincentivize socially harmful risk-
taking. 
25 The latter alone matters to those who deny the wrongful benefits principle, 
whereas both of the latter two matter to those who endorse that principle.  
26 Or evaluating and counselling others, on those (possibly rare) occasions in 
which an outsider does learn about an agent’s mental stance toward a 
wrongdoing.  Consider a priest who hears the confession of a businessman 
who would have bribed the planning committee to approve of a new shopping 
mall (of which he will benefit), but was overtaken in the deed by another 
businessman. The priest should conclude, per our analysis, that the confessor 
is a beneficiary simplictier, and has committed a moral sin. 
27 In disavowing, it is up to her to specify what exactly it is she is disavowing 
(the wrongdoing, or her benefiting from it, or both). 
28 For a formal model of how even cheap talk can be revealing over a 
protracted period, see Aumann and Hart 2003). While we think the 
unintentional beneficiary can be expected to bear a cost, clearly that has to be 
a cost morally acceptable . It is beyond the scope of this paper to define what 
that is. Factors that should be taken into account in the calculation include the 
severity of the wrong, the extent to which one benefits from it and one’s 
capacities to bear the cost. If an agent finds herself Unintentionally Benefitting 
from multiple wrongdoings, then in principle she ought to disassociate herself 
from all of them. Maybe at some point doing so would entail an unacceptable 
cumulative cost and become over-demanding (cf. Goodin 2009). That doesn’t 
mitigate the agent’s duty to act up to that point. We thank an anonymous 
referee for pressing us to clarify this point.  
29 Some would like to make the stronger point that beneficiaries from 
wrongdoing have a duty to protest against the wrongdoing of which they 
benefit, and do what they can at reasonable costs to themselves to prevent 
the wrongdoing. Accordingly, the beneficiary who fails to protest is guilty of 
failing to comply with her moral duties (a wrong of omission). But our point 
here is more modest. We merely suggest that protest would be prudent, in 
order to distinguish oneself from those who are involved in wrongdoing. 
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